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4INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the defining geographic features of economic change during the 20th 
century was a profound restructuring of the urban landscape.  America's urban areas were 
radically different in 2000 in structure and function from their counterparts in 1900.  
Changes in transportation, industrial production, and public policy drove these shifts in 
the makeup of our cities. 
 One of the most obvious changes, and one that began before the 20th century, has 
been the deconcentration of economic activity and population within each of the U.S.'s 
urban areas.  Paradoxically, as the country's rural population sharply declined, the 
population density of America's cities declined as well, due to the suburbanization of 
urban areas.     
 Connecticut has been no exception to this trend.  In 1900, 40% of the state's 
population lived in the four largest cities; by 2000, that fraction had shrunk to 14% 
(Berentsen, 2002).  The result has been that Connecticut is “not just a state with suburbs, 
but a suburban state” (Janick, 1993, p.9).  Job creation and population growth are largely 
limited to suburban and exurban towns, leaving the urban centers that fueled the state’s 
growth in the early 20th century stagnant.  This phenomenon of center-city abandonment 
is well-known, and has been a major public issue, particularly in Connecticut, since the 
1950’s (Rae, 2003).  While the literature- and public interest- in Connecticut's largest 
urban areas is rich, both the nature and the magnitude of this trend in Connecticut's 
smaller, more isolated urban areas has gathered less attention. 
 What, exactly, has led to these changes in the geographic structure of the urban 
environment?  And why study and quantify these trends?  Deconcentration has had deep 
5and lasting economic, fiscal, social, and environmental consequences.  Urban 
downtowns, which once dominated civic and economic activity in Connecticut, have 
declined substantially in importance.  This decline has been both cause and effect of 
many other changes that have occurred in New England.  Our economy has transitioned 
from manufacturing-based to service-based.  Employment—especially manufacturing—
is no longer clustered in the central city, which ironically has now become a higher-cost 
place to conduct most manufacturing activity.  Inter-urban transport largely occurs by 
automobile, which has replaced trains, while the automobile again dominates virtually all 
intra-urban transport, replacing trolleys, horses, and walking.  Coupled with increasing 
income, which increases demand for residential land, these transportation changes have 
rendered dense central cities largely obsolete.  Finally, a variety of public policy 
decisions (and non-decisions) have had profound consequences for the center city.  
Federal housing policy, urban renewal decisions, and the strict maintenance of 
Connecticut’s 18th-century municipal boundaries have weakened or even crippled 
downtown areas. 
The resources and attention given to Connecticut’s major urban centers- Hartford, 
Bridgeport, and New Haven, in particular- have been huge in recent decades.  Yet the 
spectacular collapse of their urban economies is certainly not unique, and their limited 
spatial scale has made it easier to overlook the enormous growth in suburban wealth that 
has accompanied the emptying of the core of each city.  In this analysis, I intend to 
examine the experience of all of Connecticut’s traditional urban centers—from 
Torrington and Ansonia to Willimantic and Danielson—to explore what has occurred 
6there in recent decades.  I consider the center city municipality as both the “service 
center” for its region and as a one-time or current manufacturing center. 
 This study has two broad objectives.  The first is to provide a qualitative history 
of the rise and decline of urbanism in Connecticut.  This draws mainly from secondary 
sources that describe and explain urban history at the national, state, and local level.  The 
second objective is to quantify the impact of various economic, social, and political 
conditions on health of all center cities in Connecticut.  This section uses regression 
analysis to ascertain relationships between three measures of economic health and a 
variety of explanatory variables.  The conclusion is a synthesis of the literature review 
and the results of the regression analysis.   It evaluates the determinant factors of center 
city health and suggests public policies to improve center city health.   
This analysis draws from economics, geography, and public policy.  I do not 
model the economic health of the cities in any formal sense.  The quantitative analysis is 
limited to the use of empirical tools from economics to investigate the factors that have 
been associated with the declining economic health of Connecticut’s urban areas.  The 
analysis is intended to inform public policy.  By more fully understanding the economic 
experience of all of Connecticut’s cities, we can make more informed policy choices.  On 
countless issues that local and state governments face, a deeper understanding of each 
decision’s consequences on the distribution of economic activity can help policymakers 
make wiser decisions. 
 
7BACKGROUND TO URBANISM 
 
Connecticut’s small cities and their CBDs have largely fallen from their role a 
century ago as true “centers” of economic and social activity.  Though the public sector 
continues to reside in downtown areas, center cities no longer serve the same central role 
in the civic, cultural, and economic life of Connecticut (Janick, 1993).  Private 
employment of all kinds has largely vacated from central business districts, and often 
from the service center municipality entirely.  Population has followed the same trend; 
and not surprisingly, property valuation growth is far below suburban or exurban 
municipalities, often plunging into negative rates. 
 Why has this happened?  The literature on urban economic deconcentration is 
prolific.  Here, both the rise and fall of these cities will be examined.  To understand how 
these cities declined, we must first understand how they rose to dominance—in the words 
of Douglas Rae, how the “accident of urbanism” unfolded.  Once the story of how these 
cities formed and prospered has been told, we can turn to the recent experience of urban 
deconcentration.    
Throughout this analysis, the major causal factors of urban form and their effects 
will be discussed, and their relevance to the experience of Connecticut’s small cities 
evaluated.  This thesis focuses on deconcentration, since that has been the story in 
Connecticut for most of the last century.  As we paint a picture of urban decline in 
Connecticut, particular attention will be paid to variables that have had differential 
impact across cities, so that their relative importance in economic health can be observed.   
 
8TRANSPORTATION: TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT 
 As Alex Marshall observed in his study of the modern American city, “How we 
get around determines how we live… Transportation determines the form of our places.” 
(Marshall, 2000, p. xi).  Transportation in America has radically changed since the early 
1800’s.  The shift to rail-based transit, and later to the ubiquity of the automobile, is a 
large--some would argue, the single largest--factor in understanding the rise and fall of 
urban America (Jackson, 1985).   
 The cities under study in this thesis rose to become industrial centers in the mid-
1800’s.  Some had been small farming settlements, but it wasn’t until the collision of 
several events in the evolving capitalist system of 19th century America that they became 
recognizable urban centers (Rae, 2003).  During this period, improving agricultural 
technology and the exploitation of new, fertile farmland in the Midwest produced a vast 
agricultural surplus, greatly lowering the cost of food.  Simultaneously, huge numbers of 
immigrants from Europe and Canada, seeking higher wages and lower land costs in the 
U.S., flooded East Coast cities and provided labor for new industries.  Finally, 
widespread use of technological innovations like the steam engine (and the railroad in 
particular) revolutionized manufacturing (Rae, 2003).  The new factory system of 
production exploded in Connecticut as early as anywhere else in the country, raising 
boomtowns such as Putnam out of country settlements (Ladd, 1969).   
 The rise of dense urban settlements with mixed industrial, residential, and 
commercial land uses came about through inequalities in transportation technology.  The 
railroad permitted inter-urban and inter-state transport with very low marginal cost, 
opening up Connecticut’s cities to a variety of raw materials and markets.  But a train, 
9though reliable and inexpensive to operate, can run only on a railroad, which is a fixed 
path.  Once railroad cars reached their destination and were unloaded, goods had to be 
moved on expensive, unreliable variable path transport (at this time, mainly horse 
vehicles on dirt or cobblestone streets).  People, for the most part, also lacked intra-urban 
transport that would allow them to live separate from their work.  This changed 
somewhat after 1890, when the streetcar came into wide use.  Yet the streetcar, like the 
railroad, operated on fixed routes, spatially concentrating activity along those routes. This 
difference in inter-urban and intra-urban transit concentrated urban activity around 
railroad depots, forcing manufacturers, and hence residents and retailers, to locate there.  
Only during the 1920’s, when the automobile came into wide use, did variable-path travel 
become as cheap as fixed-path travel.  Industry, no longer chained to the railroad depots, 
was able to move to cheaper land outside the center city.  Concentration became 
unnecessary, and urban residents were freed to live beyond walking distance of a public 
transit line or their place of employment; retail necessarily followed (Jackson, 1985).  
The net effect has been a steady deconcentration of activity from the urban centers since 
the 1920’s (Rae, 2003).  Below, a brief history of intra-urban transit is described, moving 
from railroad to streetcar to automobile.              
Railroads first allowed substantial numbers of Americans to live farther than 
walking distance from their place of employment.  Importantly, however, they still 
required residence within walking distance of the railroad line (Jackson, 1985).  In New 
York City, the first railroad commute began in 1832 when railroads extended up 
Manhattan Island to 125th St.  By 1843, the railroad connected New Haven to New York 
City, and real estate developments began to reach into southwestern Connecticut 
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(Jackson, 1985).  Between 1840 and 1860, the population of Greenwich increased by 
60%; Westport’s population nearly doubled.  These towns began the transformation from 
sleepy farming villages to true residential suburbs dependent on the urban core.  Though 
this phenomenon was most pronounced in greater New York, smaller cities began to see 
railroad commuting as well.  An observer noted that in the 1880’s “between 14 and 16 
trains to or from Hartford stopped at Windsor each day and that some local residents 
actually worked in the capital city” (Whetten, 1974, as quoted in Janick, 1993).  Cost to 
ride the railroad was far higher than most wage-earners could afford, and these railroad 
suburbs were accessible only to the wealthy (Janick, 1993).  Though the railroad created 
the first true suburbs for wealthy urbanites, most urban residents continued through the 
1800’s to commute by foot. 
The trolley also cheapened intra-urban transport, substantially changing urban 
land use in its own right.  Jackson (1985, p. 113) has stated that the “extraordinary 
prosperity and vitality of most urban cores between 1890 and 1950 cannot be understood 
without reference to the streetcar systems.”  By World War I, seventy Connecticut towns 
were served by electric railways (Janick, 1993).  It is important to note that the trolley did 
not substantially affect the location of manufacturing.  The streetcars moved people 
through the city, but moving materials and goods continued to require the railroads.  The 
trolley simply allowed workers to reach plants from more distant residences.  In New 
Haven, for example, streetcar systems built during the 1910’s opened up large rural areas 
around the city to upwardly-mobile, second-generation immigrant families (Brown, 1976, 
as quoted in Janick, 1993).  This served both to expand urban areas and to open up 
formerly residential areas for manufacturing, commercial, and retail uses (Jackson, 1985).      
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Because the trolley lines nearly all converged in the central business district, the 
dominance of the CBD was reinforced by the streetcar system (Jackson, 1985).  The 
trolley lines individually allowed access into the outskirts of a city, but retailers—then as 
now—focused where traffic intersected.  In the early 20th century, that meant the central 
business district.  Before automobiles, with their enormous demands for space, came into 
common use, the trolley-and-foot system of transit encouraged dense, centralized, multi-
story retail and commercial activity.     
This all changed in the 1920’s, however.  Henry Ford’s much-celebrated 
assembly-line Model T dropped in price from $950 in 1910 to $290 in 1924.  By 1925, 
the average American worker could purchase a Model T with less than three months’ 
wages (Jackson, 1985).  This explosion in automobile sales transformed the motorcar 
from a luxury of the wealthy to a fixture of mass society.   
Traffic congestion, unimaginable to most city planners at the turn of the century, 
began to impinge on American cities in the mid-1920’s (Hall, 2002).  The auto’s most 
dramatic early impact, in fact, wasn’t to drain residential population, but rather to congest 
city streets.  By 1923, traffic was so thick that some cities talked of banning cars from 
downtown streets (Jackson, 1985).  In New Haven, for example, the mayor claimed in 
1923 that the endless rows of parked cars on downtown streets were a safety hazard for 
fire trucks.  In 1937, when the problem had gotten even worse, the mayor pleaded with 
citizens to leave their cars at home and to walk to downtown (Rae, 2003).  Some 
American cities, such as Washington, Kansas City, and St. Louis, showed more 
downtown commuters used cars than transit in the 1920’s (Tobin, 1976). Indeed, 
Connecticut’s high income allowed it to lead the nation in automobile use.  By the 
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1920’s, New Haven alone would house more than fifty auto dealerships (Rae, 2003).    
This traffic swamped cities that were designed around trolleys, horses, and foot traffic.   
Eventually, however, it became inevitable that the car would be used for inter-
urban rather than purely intra-urban commuting.  New York, which claimed the world’s 
earliest and most extensive expressway system, had profound consequences for Fairfield 
County: by 1923, before even the Merritt Parkway was constructed, a National 
Geographic reporter observed “Even Connecticut, as far as Stamford, Greenwich, and 
New Canaan, is peopled with those who work in Gotham by day and sleep in the country 
by night.” (Showalter, 1923, as quoted in Jackson, 1985) Yet Connecticut itself financed 
an excellent road system starting in 1907.  A network of 14 major highways fed by 
smaller connectors was begun before WWI, and after 1921, Connecticut received 
substantial federal funding for road-building.  By 1950, Connecticut had more than 3,000 
miles of paved highway, probably more than any other state in the country (Janick, 
1993).   
While car use promoted urban congestion, the highways encouraged leaving the 
city altogether, opening undeveloped areas far from commuter rail lines for development.  
Commuting within a city was no longer necessary for middle-class residents, who were 
freed by the car to commute to other municipalities.  Fairfield County, again leading the 
pack, lobbied successfully in the 1920’s for a “boulevard” that would “be devoted to high 
speed traffic between the county and New York City.” (Wilson, 1929, as quoted in 
Janick, 1993)  The Merritt Parkway, which opened in 1938, brought parts of Fairfield 
County not well served by the railroad within commuting range of New York City.  This 
pattern was to be repeated throughout Connecticut in the coming decades.          
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A national system of limited-access highways was first considered in the mid-
1930’s.  It was not until 1956, when the Interstate Highway Bill was signed, that the 
federal government decided to subsidize auto travel on a massive scale.  The highway 
bill, and an accompanying bill that provided for its financing, created a $27 billion, 
41,000 mile system of expressways to be constructed over sixteen years.  It was designed 
to link every state capital and 90% of America’s cities of over 50,000 people.  Each 
project was to be 90% financed by the federal government (Weiner, 1987).   
 The first modern traffic studies, in the 1930’s, showed that for both large and 
small cities, the vast majority of traffic heading into the city was not through-traffic, but 
rather destined for another location inside the city.  As late as 1940, for example, 
highway planners found that 43% of the traffic on Waterbury’s state highways was local 
traffic headed in or out of the CBD; in Hartford, this figure was 50% (State of 
Connecticut, 1944; as quoted in Janick, 1993).  Most highway engineers used this 
rationale to argue for highways that pierced the very heart of cities.  A “hub-and-wheel” 
model of urban highways was advocated from the late 1930’s: a tight loop girdling the 
CBD, linked by two to six radial highways to the circumferential beltway, which would 
carry through-traffic and spur development of the city outskirts (Warner, 1972).  Only in 
this way could downtown be salvaged, for in the age of the automobile, any area without 
easy car access was thought to be doomed.  History has shown they were exactly wrong: 
cars and 19th century CBDs are incompatible on all but the tiniest scales, and the increase 
in car use necessarily meant the decline of an urban system unable to handle cars.  This 
hub-and-wheel model was incorporated into the interstate highway bill in 1956.  
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Perhaps inevitably, the massive government commitment to highways and the 
resulting pattern of land use have spelled doom for much of the nation’s mass 
transportation.  Roads, since becoming a federal concern in the 1910’s, have been 
enthusiastically and generously supported by the federal government ever since.  
Curiously, mass transportation, which like roads began as a local concern, has largely 
stayed that way (Hawken et al., 1999).  Broad-based federal support for mass transit is 
limited mainly to inter-urban transport.  While interstate highways have been 90% 
federally supported since the 1950’s, transit projects receive a fraction of their funding 
from the federal government, generally cannot condemn property for construction, and 
always require revenue from users.  Yet both systems serve mainly intra-urban traffic, 
specifically commuters (Jackson, 1985).  This glaring discrepancy has certainly harmed 
transit-based central business districts. 
This massive highway subsidy has had a very real physical impact on the city as 
buildings, streets, and public space were removed to build the interstates.  It had an even 
more profound impact, however, in the long run, by greatly lowering the cost of car travel 
relative to other forms of transport.  Transforming urban transportation from public 
transit-based to automobile-based meant obsolescence of the central business district.  As 
New Haven’s example illustrates, city centers simply can’t fit as many shoppers in cars 
as on foot.   
The vast condemnation of private land that urban highway construction required 
was extraordinarily expensive.  To minimize these costs, planners attempted to find the 
lowest-cost routes, which often passed through low-income areas and public parks.  River 
margins became popular corridors, with detrimental impacts on urban open space in cities 
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like New Haven and Hartford (Warner, 1972).  When routes through developed areas 
were built, engineers rationally minimized cost by selecting the poorest (and thus, 
cheapest to condemn) areas.  Many urban planners actually encouraged this policy, 
arguing that the highway could be a powerful tool for slum clearance.  Mayor Richard 
Lee of New Haven built the Oak Street Connector through a working-class neighborhood 
for slum clearance as well as to improve traffic flow, as the highway’s generous 500-foot 
width demonstrates (Rae, 2003).  Routing highways through poor areas made 
construction cheaper, with disastrous social effects for urban neighborhoods.  The effects 
that highway construction, urban renewal, and other public policies had on the physical 
plant of the city warrant discussion. 
HOUSING POLICY AND URBAN RENEWAL 
 In 1933, the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was established by the 
federal government.  As the agency developed, it began to produce studies of housing 
markets for cities across the country.  HOLC appraisers evaluated each neighborhood in a 
city as credit risks for home mortgages.  Factors that improved creditworthiness in 
HOLC’s evaluation included newness of development, presence of developable land, 
restrictive covenants, high social status and social homogeneity, and high home 
ownership.  These factors are not descriptive of the pre-automobile neighborhoods 
surrounding the central business districts of Connecticut’s old industrial cities; HOLC’s 
evaluations almost universally advised against investing in traditional urban 
neighborhoods.  In New Haven, for example, HOLC evaluators determined in 1937 that 
94.7% of the city’s population lived in “substandard” neighborhoods (Rae, 2003).  This 
was the origin of government “redlining,” the practice of formally delineating certain 
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neighborhoods as unworthy of credit, and thus condemning them to all-but-certain 
disinvestment.  Though HOLC likely only echoed what many loan officers already felt, 
the agency still legitimized redlining and actively discouraged urban investment.  Loans, 
if they could be obtained at all, were made at higher interest rates for urban 
neighborhoods.  This encouraged families to leave the center city for the suburbs, 
damaging the central business district and depressing property values (Jackson, 1985).  
The effect of government redlining of Connecticut’s traditional urban areas is difficult to 
quantify, but it certainly had a negative impact on urban neighborhoods and center city 
economic activity.   
After World War II, the federal government began to massively subsidize 
suburban housing at the expense of the center city.  Subsidized loans offered by the 
Federal Housing Administration and the tax deductibility of mortgage payments often 
made it cheaper to purchase than to rent a unit of space (Jackson, 1985).  Young families, 
in particular, abandoned older rental units in the cities for new tract housing in the 
suburbs.  Hartford, for example, lost 6,500 young married couples during the 1950’s, 
many for new single-family tract developments in towns like East Hartford, Manchester, 
and Bloomfield (Janick, 1993).  In the 1950’s, the state government joined the federal 
government in subsidizing this new housing by paying roughly twice as much of the 
Hartford suburbs’ school expenses than of the city itself (Clouette, 1992, as quoted in 
Janick, 1993).  The shift of population to suburban areas—indeed, much of the 
decentralization that has afflicted our center cities—has been mitigated in other regions 
of the country through the process of annexation.  As urban areas expand in response to 
economic and policy changes, the jurisdiction of the city government expands as well.  In 
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Connecticut, however, municipal borders have changed very little through time, and 
annexation has never occurred.  Connecticut’s cities are unable to absorb suburban 
growth and thus cushion the decline of the center city (Rae, 2003).        
 In the post-World War II era, as population and business activity began to leave 
traditional urban areas, revitalizing CBDs became a major concern for city governments 
(Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989).  The Housing Act of 1949 authorized the clearing of slum 
areas to improve housing and business conditions in the cities (Rae, 2003).  The rationale 
was simple: the center city, in the age of the automobile, was thought to be obsolete.  Its 
institutions, businesses, even streets and buildings would need replacement.  The 
prevailing mentality called for making a “fresh start” by “renovating entire 
neighborhoods to provide a completely new land-use pattern.” (Owen, 1959, as quoted in 
Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989).  City governments feared that without massive public 
intervention, the decline of the CBD and surrounding neighborhoods would spell doom 
for public coffers.  The local business elite feared competition from the rapidly growing 
suburbs.  With strong support from both the business and government elite, urban 
redevelopment plans for cities around the country were drafted.  By 1959, there were 
over 700 published (Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989).  Though major cities, such as 
Bridgeport, New Haven, and Hartford drafted revitalization plans, many smaller cities did 
as well, including Putnam (Ladd, 1969). 
 Hindsight has shown that the “bulldozer years” of urban renewal—the 1950’s and 
1960’s—had strongly negative impacts on the center city (Rae, 2003).  Planners who 
remade the city attempted to make it into a more modern, car-based layout- essentially, to 
suburbanize the downtown (Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989).  This failed to recognize the 
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basic economic forces that had created and sustained the central business district.  
Additionally, the ongoing uncertainty and disruption of urban renewal discouraged 
investment and shopping in the CBD.   
Throughout this period, small, locally-owned stores were destroyed in huge 
numbers to make room for new mega-projects—or, if the parking garages and office 
towers failed to materialize, the dense blocks gave way to vacant lots.  Returning to Rae’s 
(2003) analysis of New Haven, the 1950’s renewal of downtown New Haven displaced 
785 businesses. Though many of these businesses were probably of declining 
profitability, removing this dense, locally-rooted network destroyed much of what 
distinguished New Haven from the more modern suburbs.  Competition with the suburbs 
on their terms—with a suburban-style mall and car-based business district—gave the 
cities a disadvantage from the start.  The office park and enclosed mall were created by 
the car; the center city was created by trains and trolleys.  “Suburbanizing” the downtown 
was profoundly destructive to the center city, whose structure and origin, and thus 
function, was ignored.       
STRUCTURAL SHIFTS 
 
Changes in transportation were a major cause of industrial flight from the center 
city.  While railroads centralized manufacturing, highways decentralized it, greatly 
lowering the value of center-city locations for industry (Rae, 2003).  These technological 
changes disadvantaged the center city relative to the suburbs; but structural changes in 
the economics of manufacturing disadvantaged the entire region relative to the rest of the 
world.  Truly profound structural changes occurred in New England manufacturing 
during the 20th century.  Taken together, these trends are broadly known as 
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deindustrialization.  Manufacturing created the center city; in this century, it vacated not 
only the city, but often the entire region. 
 Temin (2000) has observed that New England’s key industries were largely the 
same in 1940 as a century earlier.  The region stayed dominant in American 
manufacturing during the period, growing large industrial cities.  Yet the vast majority of 
this manufacturing activity disappeared from 1940 to 2000, and manufacturing no longer 
distinguishes the region (Temin, 2000).  Shoe and textile manufacturing were never as 
dominant in Connecticut as in eastern New England.  Luckily for Connecticut, the state’s 
cities (with the exception of those in the Quinebaug Valley) did not suffer from the 
wholesale flight of these industries, which employed by 2000 less than one-eighth of their 
1948 count.  Yet the metals industry, which dominated western Connecticut, was also hit 
severely by the same trends, particularly as defense contracting declined in the last 
decades of the twentieth century (Temin, 2000). 
 The region’s manufacturing declined for several well-documented reasons.  In 
short, New England’s manufacturing after WWII was defined by archaic, multi-story 
factories built around water power and rail lines.  This center-city configuration was 
outdated: manufacturing in modern, one-story facilities using electric power and trucking 
was far more efficient (Temin, 2000).   The long, seemingly permanent presence of 
manufacturing had created a unionized, high-wage workforce and tax structures that 
discouraged capital investment (Rae, 2003).  Additionally, massive investment in the 
American South by the federal government helped make its low-wage work force 
accessible to manufacturers in New England.  Many low-skill manufacturing industries, 
particularly textiles, took advantage of the South’s more modern transportation and 
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industrial facilities (Temin, 2000).  As barriers to international trade came down, New 
England’s aged industrial stock was forced into competition with the entire world, 
increasing these competitive pressures as the century closed.       
 Essentially, the economic engine around which Connecticut’s industrial cities 
grew slowed down or all but ceased to function.  The CBD and center city 
neighborhoods, which harnessed the wealth created in the great factories of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, became obsolete.  The New Haven region provides a good example: 
nearly 28,000 factory wage-earners in the city in 1947 had dwindled to less than 3,000 a 
half-century later.  Hence the late 20th century saw center-city manufacturing decline ten-
fold.  But in suburban regions, manufacturing jobs increased by 12,000 from 1947 
through 1967, before being halved over the next 30 years (Rae, 2003).  While the suburbs 
gained for a time at the center city’s expense, as the century closed, the entire region’s 
manufacturing economy was in sharp decline.  
 The huge increase in median household income through the 20th century also had 
an undeniable hand in suburbanization.  Mills (1972) observed that there is a high income 
elasticity of demand for newer, low-density housing, which is located overwhelmingly 
outside the center city.  Housing is a normal good, and as Americans grew wealthier, 
their demand for quantity and quality of housing grew as well.  Hence Mills identifies 
growth in income as an important factor in flattening urban density gradients.  Given 
Connecticut’s long position as one of the wealthiest American states, these income 
effects are likely to have influenced urban density earlier and more forcefully than in 
other parts of the country (Janick, 1993).         
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SOCIAL FACTORS 
 Social factors also contributed to the decline of the central city.  Connecticut’s 
industrial cities were built when foot travel was the dominant mode of daily 
transportation.  The requisite density meant that through the 1800’s, a variety of ethnic 
groups, though informally segregated to some degree, were forced by sheer physical 
proximity to interact (Rae, 2003).  This changed somewhat when the trolley came into 
wide use, since the geographic area open to residential use greatly expanded.  As noted 
above, in New Haven, the trolley allowed second-generation immigrants in the 1910’s to 
segregate into more homogeneous ethnic neighborhoods.  There, the Irish took the 
eastern outskirts, the Germans the western outskirts, and the Yankees the northern 
outskirts (Brown, 1976, as quoted in Janick, 1993).  In general, these movements appear 
to be an attempt to self-segregate, rather than to escape any particular ethnic group.  This 
would change after World War II, when African-American and Hispanic migrants 
effectively stigmatized Connecticut’s center cities.  
 Each year from 1940 until the mid-1970’s, roughly 150,000 southern blacks 
moved to northern industrial cities.  Cities like New Haven, Waterbury, and Bridgeport 
absorbed huge numbers of these migrants: in New Haven alone, the black population 
would quadruple over the period to 40,000.  Starting in the 1960’s, and continuing to 
present, Hispanics began moving to Connecticut in great numbers as well (Rae, 2003).  
Less confined to the major cities than African-Americans, they have still suffered 
intensive ghettoization in Connecticut’s smaller cities (Janick, “Demographic,” 2003). 
 The timing of the arrival of these migrants was disastrous: mass migration began 
as center city manufacturing began its sharp decline, and continued as economic 
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opportunity in the center city collapsed (Rae, 2003).  African-Americans, suffering from 
racial discrimination, were denied many of the opportunities of earlier white migrants for 
social advancement, and became economically trapped in the center city.  Public housing 
began as temporary shelter for poor white families during the Depression, and was 
located almost exclusively in contemporary working-class neighborhoods.  By the 
1960’s, it was serving as increasingly permanent shelter for a black underclass; by the 
1970’s, its concentrated poverty had become synonymous with center city pathology 
(Jackson, 1985). Coupled with white flight to other neighborhoods, a major result was the 
evolution of public housing into a symbol of de facto racial segregation.  Concentration 
of poor minorities in the cities produced deeply troubled public school systems, which 
further discouraged families of any means from living in the cities (Rae, 2003).  
Furthermore, mounting racial tension in the cities erupted into rioting in the late 1960’s in 
Bridgeport, Waterbury, Middletown, New Britain, Stamford, Norwalk, New Haven, 
Hartford, and New London (Janick, “Racial,” 2003).  This violence further confirmed to 
Connecticut residents the instability and danger of the concentrated poor, which had 
become synonymous with the center city (Ladd, 1969).   
In short, the presence of concentrated minority populations in abject poverty 
stigmatized the city.  Its intense concentration of social pathology discouraged investment 
and residency in surrounding neighborhoods (Rae, 2003).  This concentration along 
economic and racial lines has been remarkably sharp in Connecticut, producing intensely 
troubled urban populations even in minor cities like Willimantic and New London.  The 
stigma of poverty and segregation continues to pose a major challenge for these 
downtown areas.   
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CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 The literature on urban economic health identifies a number of determinant 
factors.  In this paper, those factors are examined in Connecticut’s cities over the 1980-
2000 period to determine the relative impact of each.  The goal is to identify and 
determine the magnitude of causal factors that correlate with changing economic 
conditions in Connecticut’s center cities.    
 This paper uses linear regression analysis to analyze which factors correlate with 
measures of economic health, and attempts to explain them in an economic framework.  
The goal is to determine which factors are most important in explaining economic health 
so that they may gain the attention of the policymaker.   
 The “economic health” of each city, as defined here, can be represented in three 
dimensions: property value; population; and income.  Clearly all three are related, as 
rising income will increase population and hence property values as well.   
Suburbanization, similarly, will be expected to reduce all three in the center city.  Yet any 
one of the three is unlikely to tell as complete a story as all three used together, and they 
will be used to determine how decentralization has occurred.  They are represented by 
observable variables as follows: municipal Equalized Net Grand List (estimated market 
value of all property within a municipality); Census population; and Census median 
household income.   
 In a standard utility-maximization framework, a household spends its income y on
a set of goods (whose price is assumed to be given, and are purchased at unit cost c) and 
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“land” q, which may be thought of as a composite of housing structure and land, subject 
to a standard budget constraint: 
 
y = (1+t)pq + c.     
 
The unit price of land p, the tax rate on land t, and income y determine the household’s 
demand for “land” and other goods, and hence its maximum utility U*, or: 
U*(y, t, p) where U*y > 0, U*t < 0, U*p < 0
Thus, utility increases with increasing income and decreases with an increasing tax rate 
and unit price of land.  Since the price of other goods is given and assumed to be equal in 
all locations, only income, tax rate, and the unit price of land (or, more generally, 
property values) are of interest.  Using Connecticut’s 169 towns as the units of data 
collection, we can collect data on proxy variables for income, tax rate, and the market 
value of property.  For income, each municipality’s median household income is used, as 
above.  For property value, Equalized Net Grand List per capita, or the net value of all 
property in a municipality divided by its population, is used.  These two variables, as 
noted above, are used as indicators of economic health.  For the tax rate on property, the 
effective mill rate is used.  The effective (or equalized) mill rate is measured as an 
independent variable, since it is set exogenously by town governments, and may affect 
residential decisions, as noted, as well as business investment.  This basic utility function 
can be easily modified to include other variables that we believe to contribute to 
households’ utility, for example, per capita state aid to municipalities.  State aid to 
municipalities, locally perceived as “free money,” is expected to positively impact utility, 
as it means higher service levels and/or lower tax rates, all else equal.  (Note that since 
state aid for education, which constitutes the majority of aid to municipalities, is allocated 
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based on a formula that includes median household income and ENGL per capita, this 
variable will be included only in the regression on population change.)     
Three social variables will be included that could have an important impact on 
economic health: ethnic composition, crime rate, and educational attainment.  We 
observe that center cities populations are not only generally poorer than surrounding 
suburbs, but also have proportionally higher concentrations of ethnic minorities (Janick, 
“Demographic,” 2003).  Cutler et al. (1999) describe racial segregation in urban America, 
and find three temporal phases.  First, blacks and Hispanics arrived to the region through 
the cities, and with few resources for transportation or access to capital, were forced to 
settle where they landed.  These initial patterns were maintained through mid-century by 
“collective actions” by whites- i.e., legal or quasi-legal barriers to entry to white 
neighborhoods.  Finally, since around 1990, segregation has persisted through 
“decentralized racism:” whites, with greater wealth and income, outbid minorities to live 
in more favorable neighborhoods, and minorities are forced to remain in unfavorable 
urban neighborhoods.  To test the importance of the center city’s ethnic makeup on 
economic health, percentage of population that is non-white (including Hispanics) is 
included.   
 Crime is a social pathology commonly associated with the center city.  In 
Connecticut, crime rates display great spatial variation, with center cities displaying by 
far the highest crime rates (CT Dept. of Public Safety, 2001).  This great inequity in 
crime rate is believed to be related to the greatly lower income, wealth, educational 
attainment, and social connectedness of center city populations.  In particular, these 
conditions adversely affect expectations for economic improvement, making crime a 
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more appealing option for inner-city residents (Putnam, 2000).  In any case, the higher 
crime rates in the center cities may provide a disincentive to live, work, shop, and hence 
invest, there.  Index crimes per 100,000 population, as compiled by the Connecticut State 
Police, provide information on crime rates in Connecticut towns.   
 Educational attainment is a social variable that may also affect economic 
conditions.  It is likely to display a strong positive correlation with proportion of 
population white and household income, which we must note when running the 
regressions.  But high educational attainment, all else equal, may improve economic 
conditions in other ways, by encouraging small business creation and improving 
involvement in the school system and other public organizations.  For this reason, the 
percent of population twenty-five and over with any college education is included as an 
independent variable.     
 Households’ location decisions are not the only way to reflect local economic 
conditions.  Business vitality is also critical, particularly when we are examining center 
cities with a traditional role as service center and employment base.  To capture the 
effects of these sectors on the center city, we can collect data on employment in the retail 
and manufacturing sectors.  The study cities came to prominence and reached their peak 
population and relative wealth as centers of manufacturing.  The literature review 
describes this process is some detail.  These cities also historically served as service 
centers for the surrounding areas, with their central business districts serving the retail 
needs of the city and the region.  Since the primacy of the CBD was a huge part of the 
traditional city’s landscape (Rae, 2003), changes in retail employment deserve analysis.  
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The magnitude of changes in these two sectors may be expected to have a major impact 
on economic health.     
The unemployment rate, which measures utilization of the labor pool, is also a 
key indicator of economic health, since a high unemployment rate indicates that business 
activity is not able to fully utilize the labor pool in a given municipality.  This may be 
relevant as urban areas frequently suffer from low employment opportunity, but high 
population density (Weinberg, 2003).  Declines in unemployment in a city may be 
expected to increase economic health through decreases in crime and increases in 
property values, population, and income. 
Locational variables may also be important to Connecticut’s cities.  Proximity to 
major cities—particularly New York—is known to have resulted in substantial growth 
for some of Connecticut’s cities (Janick, “Demographic,” 2003).  Danbury and Stamford, 
for example, have benefited from being accessible to New York City but far enough to 
have lower wages and land values, stimulating industrial development.  Historically, Rae 
(2003) demonstrates that New Haven’s industrial success was partly due to its integration 
into the New York region’s capital, labor, and retail markets.  Similarly, the industrial 
cities of the Naugatuck Valley blossomed around Waterbury’s brass manufacturing 
activity in the mid-1800’s (Leblanc, 1969).  In general, dissemination of manufacturing 
activity from a center of activity may be expected to decline with distance.  Currently, 
location in a metropolitan economy would be expected to increase CBD health in the 
center cities under study.  CBDs that are geographically isolated outside a metropolitan 
area will have a smaller market and fewer opportunities for specialization.  In this 
analysis, two location variables—distance from New York City and distance from 
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Hartford—are used to measure the effect of distance from a major metropolitan center.         
 Although little research exists on the topic, the presence of a major educational 
institution in a city would seem to have a positive impact on economic health.  
Anecdotally, vibrant downtowns are often located near college campuses.  It should be 
noted that a college, as a non-profit institution, has an untaxable physical plant and thus 
campus real estate removes property from the tax rolls.  Yet the physical presence of a 
campus likely increases local taxable property values through amenities and stable 
employment opportunities.  Additionally, a downtown campus guarantees a stable and 
relatively immobile consumer population, much like all downtowns enjoyed in their pre-
automotive heyday.  For this reason, the ratio of student population at four-year colleges 
to town population is included as an independent variable.   
Finally, I include a variable to measure the influence of the past on present 
economic conditions.  Older manufacturing cities may be subject to “path dependency”- 
they may be constrained by their industrial legacy in their ability to generate positive 
economic conditions today.  The social and political structures, physical plant, and public 
perception of a city are good examples of conditions that may be deeply influenced by 
events of a century of more ago.  To see if history matters, I include an independent 
variable from 1900, more or less the peak of urbanism: the percentage of the municipal 
population engaged in manufacturing activities.  This reflects the “manufacturing 
intensity” of a city when manufacturing was at its peak.  Since manufacturing is the 
central activity around which central business districts formed, this variable also gives us 
some sense of the historic primacy of the central business district.        
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 As described in the Conceptual Model section, three dependent variables 
measuring economic health—ENGL per capita, population, and median household 
income—are modeled with a set of independent variables.  Three time periods—1980, 
1990, and 2000—are used, both to determine temporal differences in the relationships 
between variables, and to examine relationships in changes between decades.  Ideally the 
study would go back further, preferably to the 1940’s or earlier, when the manufacturing 
towns under study had more robust local economies and stronger downtowns.  That 
would tell a better story about how the “end of urbanism” played out. 
 The sample set is comprised of the forty-four most manufacturing-intensive cities 
in Connecticut circa 1900.  These cities were selected from the 1900 Census of 
Manufactures, which provided data on manufacturing employment and output for the top 
61 manufacturing towns in Connecticut (measured in output value).  Manufacturing 
employees per capita in 1900 was created as a proxy variable for central business district 
primacy.  This is likely the best variable available since the downtowns of interest in this 
study were created largely by manufacturing activity, and indexing manufacturing 
employees on total population shows the relative importance of the sector.  The year 
1900 was in the midst of the peak of American urbanism, as streetcar systems dominated 
intraurban transport and the automobile had not come into wide use (Jackson, 1985).  Of 
the 61 towns with appreciable manufacturing output in 1900, forty-four had 15% or more 
of the population engaged in manufacturing.  Below 15%, manufacturing employment 
per capita drops off quickly, and so only these forty-four towns comprise the set with 
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which the regressions will be run.  A list of these towns, and the percentage of their 
populations in manufacturing in 1900, is provided below.   
 
Table 1. 
Connecticut towns ranked by 
manufacturing employment, 1900 
MUNICIPALITY
% Pop. In 
Manu. In 1900 
Thomaston 35.0
Waterbury 32.5
New Britain 32.5
Naugatuck 31.3
Meriden 31.0
Brooklyn 30.7
New Hartford 29.4
Derby 29.1
Shelton 29.1
Berlin 28.9
Vernon 28.9
Manchester 28.6
Torrington 28.3
Thompson 27.4
Montville 27.3
Bridgeport 27.2
Windsor Locks 27.1
Ansonia 26.9
Bristol 25.7
Wallingford 25.2
Plainfield 25.0
Connecticut towns ranked by 
manufacturing employment, 1900 
Windham 24.8
Stafford 24.7
Southington 24.0
Seymour 23.5
Bethel 23.4
Griswold 23.3
Sterling 23.0
Winchester 22.5
Putnam 22.2
Danbury 22.1
Enfield 21.8
New Haven 19.0
Killingly 18.5
Norwich 17.9
Hartford 16.7
Middletown 16.7
Farmington 16.6
Watertown 16.2
Branford 15.9
Glastonbury 15.5
Plainville 15.4
New London 15.1
Stamford 15.1
A casual look at the list confirms anecdotally that many of the municipalities named are 
generally recognized for their traditional downtowns.  The list includes virtually all of the 
state’s major cities; many smaller cities possessing suburban or undeveloped areas (i.e. 
Winchester, Griswold, Middletown); and some towns that possess a traditional mill town 
center but are mainly characterized today as suburban (i.e. Farmington, Glastonbury, 
Branford).   
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 A brief overview of descriptive statistics below compares economic conditions in 
these 44 municipalities to those of the state at large.  Statistics from the year 2000 only 
are shown here for simplicity.   
 
Table 2.  
Forty-four traditional downtowns compared with all Connecticut municipalities, 2000 
 
Variable 
Manufacturing 
downtowns (n=44) 
All Connecticut 
municipalities (n=169) 
Median household income 
 
50037 
(11901) 
63957 
(20130) 
ENGL per capita 
 
75250 
(31132) 
115667 
(69132) 
Population 
 
38066 
(35051) 
20151 
(24403) 
State aid per capita  
 
772 
(383) 
554
(349) 
Mill rate 
 
19.07 
(5) 
17.06 
(4) 
Percentage white 
 
81.4 
(19) 
89.8 
(13) 
Percentage with any college 
 
33.1 
(8) 
41.00 
(9) 
Unemployment rate 
 
5.47 
(3) 
4.04 
(3) 
Crime rate (per 100,000) 
 
2973 
(1854) 
1860 
(1385) 
% workforce in retail 
 
11.1 
(2) 
10.4 
(2) 
% workforce in 
manufacturing 
35.7 
(10) 
27.2 
(10) 
College students per 
thousand 
20.3 
(50) 
12.3 
(78) 
(Standard deviation is placed in parentheses below each value) 
Data supplied by U.S. Census Bureau (1998, 2001, 2002), U.S. Census Office (1902), CERC (2002), CT 
State Police (2001), College Compass (1997).   
 
The first set of regressions looks at each year—1980, 1990, and 2000—as a point 
in time, regressing selected independent variables on per capita ENGL and median 
household income to ascertain relationships at that point in time.  Population is omitted as 
a dependent variable, since population per se does not measure economic conditions.  All 
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regressions were run with SHAZAM version 9.  The results of these regressions are 
described below.    
EQUALIZED NET GRAND LIST 
 ENGL per capita was regressed on mill rate, unemployment rate, percentage 
white, percentage of residents 25 or above with any college, crime rate, manufacturing 
employment, retail employment, distance to Hartford, distance to New York City, 
manufacturing intensity in 1900, and college students per capita for each of the three time 
periods.  Goodness of fit statistics for the models are presented Table 3 below, along with 
estimated coefficients and T-ratios for each independent variable.  The risk of 
endogeneity should be noted in this model, particularly with the equalized mill rate 
variable, since mill rate is set based largely on the tax base available. Since crime data are 
incomplete for 1980, that variable was omitted for that year. 
Across all three periods, equalized mill rate had a consistent and sometimes 
significant relationship with ENGL (T-ratio= -2.48, -0.81, -1.62).  This is consistent with 
theory, since to sustain a given level of local public service, a smaller per capita tax base 
will mean higher mill rates.  Connecticut’s manufacturing cities with lower tax bases had 
higher tax rates in each of the three periods. 
 Whites as a percentage of population display less consistent results.  In 1980 and 
1990, percentage white was an insignificant determinant of ENGL, though it displayed a 
negative sign.  In 2000, it was weakly significant but strongly positive, which is the 
expected result.  Apparently percentage white is not significantly correlated with ENGL 
per capita after controlling for other factors that influence property values. 
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 Percentage of population with college showed a significant positive relationship 
with ENGL in 1980 and 1990, but a weakly negative coefficient in 2000.  The high 
correlation between percentage white and percentage population with college (in 2000, 
approximately 0.7) may distort the coefficients of these two variables. 
Unemployment rate displayed a negative but not very significant effect on ENGL.  
A negative effect is expected, since more slack labor will drive down wages, reduce in-
migration, and lower property values.   
 Crime rate was insignificant in the regression in both 1990 and 2000.  This is not 
fully unexpected, since crime is expected in theory to have a negative relationship with 
income, but its relationship with property value has two effects with opposing directions. 
Higher crime rates should reduce property values, but lower property values may offer a 
less attractive “target” for criminals.  This two-way causality may explain the weak 
regression coefficient. Percentage of population working in the retail sector also lacked 
significance in all three periods.  Traditional industrial towns that have maintained a 
vibrant retail sector are expected to have higher ENGL, but the insignificance of the retail 
coefficient argues against this.  Problems may reside in the choice of variable.  Retail 
sales by town may be a better measure of the health of the retail sector than retail 
employment.  And, even if retail employment is an acceptable measure, it would be better 
measured by job location than worker location, which is the Census-reported figure used 
here.       
 Manufacturing employment, though suffering from the same data collection 
problems as retail employment, displays more interesting results.  In 1980, percent of 
workforce in manufacturing was insignificant and had a small negative coefficient.  In 
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1990, the negative coefficient was much larger and showed a T-ratio of -1.004, giving us 
some confidence in a strongly negative relationship between manufacturing employment 
and ENGL.  By 2000, the manufacturing employment coefficient was even more strongly 
negative and highly significant as a determinant of ENGL per capita.  With increasing 
confidence over time, we can say that the manufacturing sector has had increasingly 
negative consequences for property values in Connecticut’s center cities.  This may be 
due to growing obsolescence of the manufacturing physical plant, which grew more 
slowly in value than other structures; or due to falling relative wages in manufacturing, 
which lowered income and hence property values (which will be explored in the next 
section.)  In any case, towns with a large proportion of employment in manufacturing 
increasingly suffered from lower property values.  
 The two distance variables also displayed interesting results.  Distance to New 
York City was negatively associated with ENGL for all three periods and with varying 
levels of confidence.  Towns with manufacturing CBDs are influenced by the “Fairfield 
County effect,” in which proximity to New York City overwhelms other economic 
characteristics and increases property values.  A glance at the list of manufacturing cities 
confirms this: In Fairfield County, Stamford and Danbury, once tired mill towns, have 
been buoyed by economic activity spilling over from New York.  Distance to Hartford, 
meanwhile, showed a weakly positive and insignificant effect for 1980 and 1990, but a 
strongly positive and significant result for 2000.  Even controlling for Fairfield County, 
downtowns farther from Hartford had higher per capita property values.  Heffley 
(personal comm., March 29, 2005) cites other distance gradients that may affect ENGL, 
such as distance to Boston and the shore, which may overwhelm the effect of metro 
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Hartford on property values.  It is interesting, however, that proximity to Hartford has 
had an increasingly adverse effect on property values in the many downtowns that 
surround it. 
 Manufacturing intensity in 1900 showed a strongly negative and somewhat 
significant relationship with ENGL in both 1980 and 1990.  Apparently history matters—
historical manufacturing dominance, for reasons explored in the Literature Review, is 
still felt in the late twentieth century in depressed property values.  This is grim news for 
manufacturing downtowns, since their set of historical physical and social endowments 
lowers their per capita property values.  No clear relationship is discernible in 2000, 
which could be due to the declining importance of this historical variable, or simply 
misspecification of the model.    
 College students per capita had a negative relationship with ENGL per capita in 
all three periods, though it was modestly significant only in 1980 and 1990.  In the case 
of property values, the college student variable is likely representing the physical 
campus’s impact on the town’s ENGL.  Campuses are tax-exempt, so their physical plant 
is not part of the town’s Grand List.  College students as a proportion of the total town 
population is probably correlated with ratio of the campus’s physical value to that of the 
entire town.  Thus the negative coefficient associated with this variable likely describes 
lower per capita Grand List due to the large exemptions of campus property.  For state 
institutions, however, lower ENGL per capita due to college campuses is not necessarily 
damaging to municipal revenues, since state PILT (payments in lieu of taxes) provides 
support to the town.  For private institutions, which don’t provide revenues to municipal 
governments, this revenue is not available to towns and likely stresses local finances.  
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This regression suggests the tax-exempt campus overwhelms the positive effect of a 
campus on surrounding property values.  Another interesting analysis would be 
regression of college students or campus “value” on mill rate, to determine if higher local 
property taxes are required to make up for the lost taxable property in a campus.   
Despite the presence of eleven explanatory variables, each of the three regressions 
in Table 3 accounts for about 3/5 of the variation in ENGL per capita across the 44 towns 
in the sample.  This suggests that there may be other factors that the model currently 
omits. 
 
Table 3.  
Equalized net Grand List per capita regressions 
Variable 1980 Adj. R2 =
0.60 
1990 Adj. R2
=0.61 
2000 Adj. R2 =
0.61 
Est. 
coefficient
T-ratio 
33 DF 
Est. 
coefficient 
T-ratio 
32 DF 
Est. 
coefficie
nt 
T-ratio 
32 DF 
Mill rate -377.5 -2.48 -987.0 -0.81 -87.7 -1.62 
Unemployment -551.3 -1.07 -851.6 -0.30 -1071.5 -0.56 
% White -109.0 -0.94 -74.0 -0.17 414.0 1.00 
% College 266.4 1.50 1321.3 1.31 -594.4 -0.94 
Crime rate ---- ---- 0.2 0.65 3.35 0.69 
Retail employ. 139.1 0.42 79.1 0.41 7055.6 1.910 
Manu employ. -8.6 0.06 -1087.2 -1.00 -4240.6 -4.10 
Dist to NYC -38.0 -1.26 -280.85 -2.39 -14.0 -1.54 
Dist to 
Hartford 
20.0 0.45 176.5 0.81 633.5 2.70
Manu. In 1900 -189.2 -1.67 -824.0 -1.62 -157.2 -0.41 
College stud. -16178 -1.42 -99589 -1.59 -301.9 -0.19 
INCOME 
 The explanatory variables below were regressed on median household income to 
determine their relationship in each decade.  Goodness-of-fit of this income model was 
higher than that of ENGL.   
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 Mill rate, which was negatively correlated with ENGL, showed negative but 
completely insignificant coefficient with income.  Apparently differentials in mill rate 
had no effect on median income across Connecticut’s mill towns.  Percentage white also 
showed no significant relationship with income, suggesting that race is not correlated 
with income after controlling for other factors in the regression.  This is heartening, since 
anecdotally we observe positive correlations between the poverty rate and racial 
minorities.  Apparently race itself is not a determinant of community income.     
 The picture is muddied somewhat by the college variable.  This variable shows 
high correlation with percentage white, as noted above, which may mask the effect of 
race on income.  Here, college has a strong positive effect on income in all three periods, 
though the effect is only significant in 1980 and 1990.  College’s positive effect is 
consistent with theory, since a better-educated population, all else equal, is expected to 
have higher income. 
 Unemployment displays a strongly negative effect on income, but its importance 
declined through the three time periods, becoming insignificant in 2000.  The negative 
effect is expected, due to the processes described in the ENGL section above.  Crime rate, 
as for ENGL, gave an unclear picture.  It was insignificant in 1990 but negative and 
strongly significant for 2000.  Apparently crime rate has become a more significant drag 
on median income in Connecticut’s downtowns. 
 The two employment variables failed to exhibit strong effects on income.  
Through 1980 and 1990, only manufacturing employment was weakly significant (in 
1990), and through all three time periods, the sign of the coefficients was inconsistent.  
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Retail and manufacturing employment apparently fail to capture much of the variation in 
income across the study municipalities. 
 The two locational variables, distance to New York City and Hartford, also failed 
to have as much impact as expected.  Theory would predict that income, like unit 
property values, would decline with distance from the metropolitan centers.  The scale of 
this gradient is likely to be large and expanding, since higher income groups will buy 
more land and housing farther from the city.  A “cavity” may exist surrounding the center 
city, but at some distance commuting becomes too costly and property values begin to 
decline.  Yet in 1980, both variables display a positive and mildly significant relationship.  
In 1990, both variables fail to show significance, while in 2000, both variables show the 
expected significant negative coefficient.  Though perhaps this may be interpreted as 
suggestive that the income gradient increased over time, it’s more likely that these 
locational variables fail to adequately model income.  
 The historical variable, manufacturing in 1900, showed no significant relationship 
in any of the three periods.  This result stands in contrast to the regressions on ENGL, 
which showed a significant relationship.  Apparently this historical feature affects 
property values more than income in Connecticut’s mill towns.  This incongruity is 
somewhat surprising, since historical factors lowering property values without having a 
corresponding effect on income is difficult to explain in a traditional framework.  
Property values should be directly related to income.  The lack of impact on income may 
be due to the fact that the physical plant of a city changes very slowly over time, so the 
physical endowments of these mill towns lowers property values but residents are still 
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able to earn the prevailing regional wage in other towns.  In any case, this issue deserves 
more study. 
 College students per capita also showed somewhat mixed results.  As with ENGL, 
1980 showed a negative and significant result.  For Census purposes, college students are 
reported as residents at their campus, and hence are likely to lower income in that 
municipality.  In 1990, the effect was negative but not significant, and for 2000 the effect 
was insignificantly positive.  This positive result is inconsistent and given its low T-ratio 
can likely be ignored.  Note that the high coefficient of the college student variable 
results from the very low value of college students per capita.       
 
Table 4.                 
Median household income regressions 
Variable 1980 Adj. R2 =
0.85 
1990 Adj. R2 =
0.81 
2000 Adj. R2 =
0.81 
Est. 
coefficient 
T-ratio 
33 DF 
Est. 
coefficient 
T-ratio 
32 DF 
Est. 
coefficient 
T-ratio 
32 DF 
Mill rate -31.5 -0.48 -145.9 -0.52 -9.5 -0.67 
Unemployment -1109.3 -5.05 -859.5 -1.31 -458.7 -0.91 
% White 17.9 0.36 26.8 0.27 -26.1 -0.24 
% College 288.2 3.79 812.2 3.49 78.2 0.47
Crime rate ---- ---- -0.01 -0.21 -4.5 -3.46 
Retail employ. 3.6 0.03 -328.8 -0.73 2448.3 2.51 
Manu employ. 61.7 0.93 290.2 1.16 -993.3 -3.64 
Dist to NYC 18.2 1.41 -20.3 -0.75 -7.6 -3.16 
Dist to 
Hartford 
24.3 1.28 17.2 0.34 -82.0 -1.32 
Manu. In 1900 10.1 0.21 79.2 0.67 -80.8 -0.79 
College stud. -18730 -3.83 -12115 -0.84 280.2 0.68 
CHANGE, 1980-2000 
 The second set of regressions analyzes change in each variable over the study 
decades.  Rather than collect values for each variable at a point in time, the goal here is to 
determine how changes in each decade in the dependent variables have been affected by 
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changes in the independent variables.  For each variable, values are in terms of 
percentage change over the time period.   
 Since correlation between the three dependent variables is likely, the three 
regressions were run as a system of equations for each decade (1980-1990, 1990-2000).  
This allows us to isolate impacts of the independent variables on each of the three 
dependent variables, correcting for correlation between the dependents that may mask the 
true effects of the independents.     
 The first dependent variable, percent change in Equalized Net Grand List per 
capita, was regressed on the same independent variables as above but using percentage 
change in the following variables: mill rate, percentage of population white, percentage 
of population with any college education, unemployment rate, percent in retail, and 
percent in manufacturing.  For 1980-1990, the regression showed an adjusted R2 = 0.47; 
for 1990-2000, R2 = 0.68, indicating a better fit of the model over that decade. 
 Change in mill rate, percent white, and percent college, while mostly significant, 
all showed different signs between the decades.  This discrepancy is apparently not 
caused by problems of correlation, as described above, since the highest correlation 
between the three variables is 0.28.  This may show misspecification of the model, and 
thus make it hazardous to draw any meaning from the regressions.  Or, the high T-ratios 
may indicate that the directions of the effects of these variables actually changed between 
the decades.  I will assume the latter but not attempt to draw much meaning from these 
first three variables.   
 Percentage change in unemployment rate and retail employment, however, 
showed negative and somewhat more significant effects on change in ENGL.  The 
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direction of change in unemployment is expected: an increase in unemployment rate 
should decrease ENGL over the period, for reasons explored above.  But an increase in 
percentage retail should have the opposite effect: increasing retail employment indicates 
increasing relative importance of the retail sector, and hence increasing importance of the 
center city in the regional economy.  (Given structural shifts in the Connecticut economy 
toward primacy of the retail sector, retail as a percentage of the economy increasing 
across all towns is expected.  But that this increase should correlate negatively with 
change in ENGL is interesting.)  A likely explanation is that retail employment generates 
relatively little growth in the Grand List compared with more heavily capitalized 
employment like manufacturing.  Change in manufacturing, while showing insignificant 
results in the 1980’s, shows a somewhat more significant positive effect on change in 
ENGL in the 1990’s.  This is consistent with the story developed above about the smaller 
effect of retail employment versus manufacturing employment on ENGL.  This entire 
explanation, of course, must bear the caveat that employment as measured here is by 
place of employee residence rather than employment location.  This aside, town planners 
who wish to grow their Grand List by attracting retail employment may find that the 
effects of that growth are disappointing.  
 Change in crime rate displays a significant effect on ENGL during the 1990’s.   
Center cities that grew fastest had the largest increase in crime rate.  One normally would 
expect a decreasing crime rate to boost the growth in property values, so this positive 
regression coefficient may have another explanation. During the 1990s, crime rates fell 
substantially, particularly in central cities, perhaps due to an improved national economy 
and more stringent law enforcement (e.g., “three strikes” legal provisions).  These same 
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larger cities, though, continued to experience the slowest growth, or even declines, in 
property values, perhaps resulting in the observed positive correlation. 
 Both locational variables suggested that manufacturing towns farthest from New 
York and Hartford grew fastest—that is, exurban growth exceeded metropolitan growth.  
This is consistent with the anecdotal observation that growth rates are persistently highest 
on the urban fringe, which is continually moving outward.  This may mean that 
manufacturing towns that are seem remote and poorly situated—Willimantic, Winsted, 
and the towns of the Quinebaug Valley—may be positioned to absorb the most rapid 
growth in coming decades.  For the 1990-2000 decade, however, the effect of distance 
from NYC on the change in ENGL per capita seems to have waned.  It should be pointed 
out that the 1990s in Connecticut included a period of recovery from the property market 
“bubble” of the late 1980s. 
 Manufacturing in 1900 showed an insignificant negative effect on change in 
ENGL.  Similarly, college students showed inconsistent but insignificant effects on the 
change in ENGL, preventing us from drawing any meaningful insights. (Note that this 
variable does not measure change in college students, but rather college students per 
capita at the beginning of the period.  Change in college population was so tiny that the 
point-in-time variable was retained to regress on change in ENGL, population, and 
income.) 
 
Table 5.  
Change in ENGL (as system of equations) 
Variable 
 
80-90 R2= 0.47 90-00 R2=0.68 
Est. coefficient T-ratio Est. coefficient T-ratio 
0 mill 107.3 4.53 -0.09 -0.99 
0 white -231.0 -2.72 1.19 3.81 
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0 coll 52.2 2.30 -0.81 -3.06 
0 unemploy. -18.6 -1.55 -0.18 -1.32 
0 retail -30.0 -1.55 -0.56 -2.52 
0 manu -36.9 -0.74 0.40 1.36 
0 crime ---- ---- 0.34 3.40 
Dist to NYC 21.6 1.85 -0.79 -0.89 
Dist to Hart. 32.5 1.70 0.42 2.32
Manu. In 1900 -27.7 -0.50 -0.41 -0.97 
College stud. 3212.4 0.47 -28.26 -0.50 
The second regression in the system of equations was change in population over 
the 1980’s and 1990’s.  The same independent variables were used, with the addition of 
change in per capita state aid.  State aid PC was excluded from the regressions on median 
household income and ENGL because those factors are explicitly considered in the state 
formula for education aid, leading to a potential problem of reverse causality. 
 State aid PC was expected to have a positive relationship with population, since it 
constitutes “free money” that should enter into a potential resident’s utility function as 
lower taxes and/or higher level of public services.  Though both decades had a significant 
result (only mildly so in the 1990’s) of equal magnitude, each also had a different 
direction.  Perhaps state aid became targeted more toward faster-growing center cities 
during the 1990’s.  Other than that, there is little we can tell from this variable.  The same 
goes for change in mill rate, which was insignificant and showed a change in sign 
between the decades. 
 Change in percentage white, however, showed a predictable result.  An increase 
in percentage white was associated with an increase in population.  This is consistent 
with trends of exurban population growth, which is largely white.  This result is 
buttressed by the college change variable, which is insignificant in the 1990’s but positive 
and moderately significant in the 1980’s.  The fastest-growing towns are those on the 
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periphery, and the growth is likely to be among wealthier, better-educated whites.  Towns 
with increasing minority populations are within the inner metropolitan ring and 
experiencing stagnant or negative growth overall.  These results would likely be even 
stronger if all towns were included in the regression rather than just traditional mill 
towns, which are likely to grow slower in population white and college than undeveloped 
towns on their outskirts.    
 Change in unemployment was mildly significant only in the 1980’s, when it 
exerted the expected negative effect on ENGL growth.  The two employment variables, 
however, showed a positive effect in both decades (though were significant only during 
the 1990’s.)  Growth in manufacturing employment exerting a positive impact on 
population is expected, and its effect is likely intensified with manufacturing’s large 
multiplier.  Though the positive impact of retail employment is inconsistent with its effect 
on ENGL, growth in retail as a sector of the economy is consistent with theory—the 
fastest growing cities are likely to experience the fastest growth in the number and variety 
of retail establishments, and this suggests that retail grows as a segment of local 
employment as population grows.   
 Change in crime rate failed to display a significant impact in the 1990’s.  The 
locational variables, meanwhile, were both clearly insignificant in the 1980’s and more 
significant in the 1990’s.  The sign of the coefficient on distance to Hartford was positive, 
which is consistent with the ENGL result that suggests exurban growth is most rapid.  For 
distance to New York City, however, the sign was negative, suggesting that cities with 
downtowns closest to the city actually experienced more rapid population growth than 
those farther away.  This seems unlikely, especially since the cities closest to the cities 
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are already among the most built-up and have less ability to add residents given zoning 
constraints, and may suggest a misspecification of the model. 
 As with ENGL, manufacturing intensity in 1900 and college students per capita     
continue to show inconsistent and insignificant results.  The only significant observation 
was college students per capita in the 1980’s, which showed a positive sign.  This may 
indicate that the presence of a university in the 1980’s resulted in faster population 
growth.   
Table 6.  
Change in population (as system of equations) 
Variable 
 
80-90 R2= 0.45 90-00 R2=0.44  
Est. coefficient T-ratio Est. coefficient T-ratio 
0 PC state aid -0.026 -2.99 0.027 1.27 
0 mill 0.035 0.48 -0.015 -0.42 
0 white 0.317 1.23 0.290 2.35
0 coll 0.106 1.58 -0.017 -0.16 
0 unemploy. -0.040 -1.14 0.035 0.66 
0 retail 0.033 0.58 0.189 2.07
0manu 0.121 0.80 0.118 1.01 
0 crime ---- ---- -0.031 -0.73 
Dist to NYC 0.058 0.02 -0.045 -1.30 
Dist to Hart. -0.001 -0.08 0.086 1.20 
Manu. In 1900 -0.013 -0.47 -0.079 -0.46 
College stud. 9.69 1.43 -4.058 -0.18 
The final equation of the three-equation system was the regression on change in 
income.  The same eleven variables used in the regression on ENGL are retained.  As 
with ENGL, the model displays substantially better goodness-of-fit in the 1990’s than in 
the 1980’s.   
 Change in mill rate and change in percent white each display a barely meaningful 
and expected result with respect to income in the decade in which they produce a T-ratio 
better than one.  Mill rate is expected to decline with increasing income—towns with 
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increasing income (and hence tax base) are expected to enjoy lower growth in mill rate.  
These towns (likely exurban) that are increasing in income are expected to have the 
lowest increase in minority population (and hence, the greatest relative increase in 
percent white.)  This is consistent with the story above, that those manufacturing towns 
on the exurban periphery are likely to enjoy the best general economic conditions and 
greatest relative racial homogeneity. 
 Change in college, as expected, shows a mildly significant positive effect on 
income.  Towns with increases in educational attainment would be expected to have 
increases in income.  Similarly, change in unemployment rate displays a negative and 
significant relationship with change in income, as expected: towns that lower their 
unemployment rate increase their income.   
 Change in manufacturing employment, interestingly, shows no significant 
relationship with change in income.  Apparently change in manufacturing employment 
has no relationship with change in income, a surprising outcome given the large 
multiplier commonly ascribed to manufacturing employment in Connecticut.  Perhaps the 
impacts of manufacturing have been overstated, or perhaps the town level is too fine to 
capture the effects of loss of manufacturing jobs (which was the overwhelming trend 
across both decades.)  Since workers in the manufacturing industries of the center city are 
likely to live across the region, the effects on income from loss of manufacturing 
employment may be spread across the entire region.  This is suggested by the regressions 
on ENGL, where the 1990’s showed a significant positive relationship between change in 
ENGL and change in manufacturing employment.   
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 Change in percentage of workers in retail showed a significant result only in the 
1980’s, when a negative relationship with change in income was predicted.  This is 
consistent with the results for ENGL, and suggests that decline of the retail sector is 
correlated with declining income.  This would seem to fit the story of many traditional 
downtowns, which have seen declining economic relevance as income in the center city 
drops and retail activity moves to the suburbs.  It should be noted that a negative 
relationship between change in crime rate and change in income was weakly suggested. 
 The two locational variables displayed few meaningful results with respect to 
change in income.  Distance to Hartford failed to show significance in either decade, 
suggesting that towns with downtowns in the Hartford metro area showed income growth 
different from the state at large.  Distance to New York was significant in both decades, 
but showed a negative sign in the 1980’s and a positive sign in the 1990’s.  Perhaps faster 
income growth in Fairfield County in the 1980’s was overtaken by faster income growth 
in the rest of the state in the 1990’s. 
 Manufacturing in 1900 failed to show a significant relationship with change in 
income, again showing no relationship with change in economic health.  Here again, 
however, we note a negative coefficient, and this consistent sign is suggestive that 
manufacturing intensity in 1900 is a drain on current economic growth.  College students 
per capita showed a positive moderately significant result in the 1980’s with respect to 
income, suggesting that presence of a university exerted a positive effect on income 
during that decade.  
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Table 7.  
Change in median household income (as system of equations) 
Variable 
 
80-90 R2= 0.41 90-00 R2=0.63  
Est. coefficient T-ratio Est. coefficient T-ratio 
0 mill 0.026 0.23 -0.040 -1.04 
0 white -0.267 -0.67 0.148 1.17 
0 coll 0.213 2.01 0.275 2.56
0 unemploy. -0.215 -3.84 -0.063 -1.11 
0 retail -0.200 -2.21 0.064 0.71 
0 manu -0.024 -0.10 0.005 0.04 
0 crime  ---- ---- -0.041 -0.98 
Dist to NYC -0.186 -3.40 0.039 1.07 
Dist to Hart. 0.081 0.91 0.012 0.17
Manu. In 1900 -0.023 -0.09 -0.122 -0.71 
College stud. 38.4 1.19 -4.007 -0.17 
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CONCLUSION 
 The results above point toward a number of directions for future research.  First, 
as noted above, it would be instructive to continue this analysis into earlier decades.  By 
beginning in 1980 (due to data availability constraints), this study looks at cities “after 
the damage is done” rather than examining them while the processes of de-urbanization 
were occurring most rapidly (during mid-century).  Secondly, it would be interesting to 
analyze the effects of other independent variables.  Since transportation has had such a 
large role in changing center cities, more data on transportation use could be instructive.  
The percent of residents with an automobile or the percent leaving town to work, percent 
commuting with public transit, or accessibility of rail or limited-access highway, for 
example, may each have a relationship with economic health.          
 The regressions in this study paint a mixed picture for Connecticut’s center cities.  
Clearly they face a unique set of challenges.  Yet the options for policymakers to pursue 
are limited, and this analysis fails to point to a set of clear instructions for policymakers.  
It is particularly grim to note that these downtowns are hampered by their industrial past.    
In general, local policymakers are most concerned on a day-to-day basis with 
local property rate, and strive to minimize mill rate by both growing ENGL, obtaining 
more state aid, and holding down spending (Rae, 2003).  Though this seems rational from 
the perspective of short-term political economy, this research suggests no clear 
relationship between mill rate and income or change in mill rate and change in the three 
indices of economic health.  Though minimizing mill rate may keep voters happy each 
year, in a broader sense, it doesn’t seem to improve general economic conditions in 
Connecticut’s downtowns.  Yet increasing employment in the retail sector, a common 
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side effect of localities’ pursuit of development, also fails to provide a clear benefit to 
economic conditions.  And maintaining manufacturing employment, which local and 
state officials often go to great lengths to do, fails to consistently improve economic 
conditions either.  Perhaps the greatest lesson of the quantitative analysis is that economic 
conditions are largely out of the hands of local policymakers.  Though municipal officials 
may exert some positive influence on economic conditions (and they can certainly exert a 
strongly negative influence), they are largely captive to the hand they were dealt.  In 
1900, these cities by and large had a very good hand; by 2000, a few were still 
prospering, some had merely survived, and many had folded. 
A step back at the broader picture does give some hints for achieving more 
balanced regional growth.  Increasing the scale of local government such that post-urban 
development is incorporated under the same local government as the downtown would 
mitigate the tax-service death-spiral of the center cities.  Decades after recognition of this 
phenomenon in Connecticut’s largest cities, which still suffer from by far the highest 
property taxes in the state, smaller cities continue to get sucked into patterns of declining 
tax base, increasing mill rate, increasing white flight, and increasing poverty (Myron and 
Orfield, 2003).  Regionalization of local government would not only mitigate central city 
decline (by stabilizing tax rates) but also feed more revenue into the stressed center city.   
Another critical reform would be rationalizing transportation policy.  Federal 
transportation policy heavily subsidizes operating and maintenance expenses for 
highways and roads, while (somewhat bizarrely) requiring transit to collect substantial 
user fees.  Furthermore, federal capital expenditures are heavily weighted toward 
automotive infrastructure.  States and localities are left to take care of much intra-urban 
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transit (especially buses) themselves.  Since downtowns and center cities are much less 
conducive to auto use than to transit use, removing these distortions to transportation 
markets would likely improve economic conditions in the center city. 
A final reform would be changing municipal zoning.  Municipal zoning continues 
to be based on a Progressive-era model of separation of uses.  This model was designed 
to relieve the oppressive density of center-city slums and separate residences from the 
intense pollution of center-city heavy industry.  In 21st century Connecticut, this is 
obsolete: heavy industry has virtually disappeared, and industry that remains is no longer 
a local health hazard.  Policymakers are concerned more with the low and ever-declining 
density of a car-dominated state than with adverse effects of high density.  Yet the state 
retains this outdated model for virtually all municipal zoning.  Changing local zoning 
ordinances to encourage traditional mixed-used redevelopment of urban areas would 
reduce welfare losses from excess transportation, and allow traditional urban areas that 
are conducive to mixed uses to re-enter the economic mainstream.  Restricting greenfield 
development in rural and exurban municipalities would also strengthen the competitive 
position of the center city. 
 This research suggests that these reforms would improve economic conditions in 
the center city.  Rather than simply benefit the largest and worst-off cities, these changes 
could improve downtowns in cities across the state.  
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